The effect of regret on optimal bidding in auctions by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard


S"
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1342
the l
MA)
U,\
The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
Richard Engelbrecht- Wiggans
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1342
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
March 1987
The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Associate Professor
Department of Business Administration

Abstract
:
While most models of auctions and competitive bidding assume that
each bidder's utility for an outcome depends only on his own profit,
we allow the utility to also depend on any regret that a bidder suffers
after the fact, for example over "money left on the table" in Federal
offshore oil lease sales. Typically, for risk neutral bidders who,
after the fact, know the winner's price for the object, a bidder's
optimal bidding strategy will not depend on the relative weight given
to profit versus regret. However, if losers do not learn the winner's
price, then the bidders' reactions to regret hurts the bid-taker at
equilibrium. Thus, the existing models' exclusion of regret from risk
neutral bidders' utility functions affects the applicability of the
resulting theory only under certain, now clearly delineated, con-
ditions .
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Introduction:
Developments in the theory of auctions and competitive bidding
derive from three sources—observations of the real world, experiments
in the laboratory, and analyses of mathematical models. Each con-
tributes in its own way. Each also has its own limitations. But,
together they result in a richer theory than could result from any one
source by itself.
Specifically, observing actual auctions carefully enough reveals
real situations and phenomena to be studied, modelled, or explained.
So, observations provide a necessary link to the real world. However,
at best, we can only accurately observe what actually happens in
actual situations as we perceive them. This affords little opportunity
for repeated observations of what happens in a specific situations for
defining the specific situation, or for modifying the specific
situation.
On the other hand, laboratory experiments replace the real world
with a model of the auction and its environment. This flexibility in
defining the auction rules and environment allows for the observation
of how the surrogates react to many different, not necessarily real
world, situations. This flexibility also carries a cost— the respon-
sibility to think, about how the laboratory situation relates to the
real world. In addition, experiments substitute surrogates for the
real world bidders. This also carries a cost— the experiences, motiva-
tion, and expertise of the surrogates may differ from those of real
bidders, and, therefore, so too might their reaction to any specific
situation.
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Finally, mathematical models go even one step further from the
real world; they model not only the auction rules and the environment
within which the auction occurs, but may model the bidders. If
analytically tractable, such models suggest hypotheses to be tested
experimentally, hypotheses that might otherwise not have been thought
of. However, the increased flexibility in defining situations also
carries an increased responsibility; by modelling the bidders in addi-
tion to the auction itself, the chances to misrepresent the real world
increase.
In particular, the usefulness of a model depends on the extent to
which it captures or represents something of practical interest. A.
model might give rise to certain phenomena observed in the real world,
and thereby be useful In suggesting how and why such phenomena arise
in the real world. Alternatively, a model might focus on one par-
ticular aspect of actual auctions, and thereby be useful in under-
standing how this aspect affects what happens in the real world and
why. In either case, though, what practical insights can be gained
from the model and its analysis depends on how sensitive the results
are to exactly how the model approximates the real world.
This paper examines the sensitivity—or lack thereof—of the
theory to a particular change in modelling the bidders themselves. By
definition, each bidder bids as if he were maximizing his expected
utility from the auction as he sees it; while this describes what bid
a bidder will make, it does not prescribe, or even necessarily
describe, how the bidder comes up with the bid. Of course, the bid-
der's utility depends on the outcome. The outcome, in turn, depends
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on how everyone bids. Thus, a particular bidder's expected utility
depends not only on his own bid, but also on how he believes others
would bid in response to any possible view that they may have of the
actual situation, as well as on our particular bidder's beliefs about
the relative probability of others' views of the situation given his
own view of the situation.
In some models, a bidder's expected utility maximizing bid remains
the same regardless of how others bid; the expected utility may
change, but not necessarily what bid maximizes the expected utility.
However, in the absence of such "dominant bidding strategies," how a
bidder bids depends on his perceptions about how others will bid.
Still, if a bidder's perceptions about others changes very little from
one auction to another, then the Nash equilibrium provides a possible
characterization of everyone's behavior; an equilibrium exists if no
one bidder could do better than to continue bidding as he has in the
past so long as others continue to bid as they have in the past.
Not everyone accepts the Nash equilibrium as an appropriate model
of bidder's behavior. Yet, despite any reservations, the Nash equilib-
rium remains a commonly used model. In fact, we know of no better
model; in this sense at least, the Nash equilibrium is the natural
model. Moreover, we suspect that most reservations with Nash equilibria
actually stem more from an inappropriate choice of utility function or
from an inappropriate model of how each bidder perceives others and the
real world than from any flaw in Che equilibrium concept itself. There-
fore, we question the form of utility function typically used, or more
precisely, we will examine the effects from modifying the usual utility
function form.
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Most existing models of auctions and competitive bidding assume
one specific form of utility function. (For examples, see the work of
Vickrey (1961), Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), or the sur-
vey of Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1980).) While the bidders—as modelled by
the utility function—might be risk neutral or risk averse, the util-
ity of any outcome depends only on the bidder's profit from that out-
come. Although this captures what may be the most important component
of bidders' utility functions, it ignores other potentially important
components. We therefore look to the real world in asking what might
we want to put into the utility function in addition to, or possibly in
place of, profit.
In this spirit, reacting to comments from bidders on Federal
offshore oil lenses that they bid to maximize the quantity of mineral
reserves won rather than to maximize expected profit— the profit on an
oil lease being so affected by others' decisions once the lease has
been won that the bidder might be unable to even define what is meant
by "profit"—Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) defines a Principal-Agent
model of competitive bidding. In the model, bidders act as agents
for their respective oil firms, but bid to maximize how much they win
gross of what they must pay for it. Of course, without any constraint
on how bidders bid, such an objective would drive up the price of leases
without limit. So, the oil firm, acting as the principal, places some
constraint on how its agent may bid. For an appropriately set limit
on bidder's expected expenditures, the bidder's bidding will be indis-
tinguishable from how he would have bid were he maximizing expected
profit. (Operationally, an oil firm may encourage its bidder to win as
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many mineral reserves as possible subject to some longer term feedback
on whether the bidder is on average spending too much or too little per
sale.) On the other hand, any constraint on a bidder's total exposure
in an auction typically results in distinctly different bidding. Thus,
any theory for expected profit maximizing bidders applies equally well
if bidders maximize expected gross winnings subject to an appropriate
constraint on expected expenditures, but not if the constraint is on
total exposure in a sale. This helps broaden and define the limits of
the existing theory.
In the same spirit, the current paper reacts to the concern over
"money left on the table"— the amount of money the winner could have
saved himself in a first-price sealed-bid auction had he known, when he
bid, what his nearest competitor would bid. This suggests letting the
utility function depend on regret as well as on profit. Including the
regret suffered by the loser who has a value for the object in excess
of the price paid by the winner seems logical. Thus, keeping things
as simple as possible, we consider defining a bidder's utility as a
linear combination of profit and regret.
Roughly speaking, we shall show that if, at the end of the auction,
a bidder learns the winner's price, then the relative weight given to
profit versus regret in the utility function does not affect that bid-
der's optimum bidding strategy. Thus, all the theory for expected pro-
fit maximizing bidders applies equally well in many practical situations
with bidders who are risk neutral but consider regret in addition to
profit. However, a simple example illustrates the importance of bid-
ders, after the fact, knowing the winner's price.
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Bell's (1982) work in utility theory supports our choice of the
utility function form. In particular, he suggests utility functions of
the form u(s,t) = v(s) + f (v(s )-v( t ) ) . Extending his definitions of s
and t to our, more general, setting suggests indentifying s as a bid-
der's actual profit, and t as the profit that the bidder could have had
from bidding different than he actually did had he known when he bid
what he knows after the fact. Then for risk neutral bidders, the ex-
pression becomes u(s,t) = as + f(as-at), where a is a constant between
zero and one. Note that, since for almost all bids, the regret varies
continuously with the bid, for our problem t must be no less than s.
So defining f(z) = (l-a)z/a for non-positive z, and f(z) = for non-
negative z gives u(s,t) = as - (1-a) max {0, (t-s)}; the utility is a
linear combination of profit and regret, with the constant a parameter-
izing the weighting, just as we already suggested.
We close with a brief outline of what follows. The next section
defines our notation, defines regret in terras of this notation, derives
an expression for a bidder's ex-ante expected utility, and establishes
conditions under which a bidder's optimal strategy is independent of
the parameter a< • roughly speaking, if, after the fact, each bidder
knows the winner's price, then the necessary condition will typically
be satisfied, and so the optimal strategy will be independent of the
parameter a. The following section provides two illustrative examples.
One illustrates the independence of the optimal bidding strategy from
the parameter a when, after the fact, losers know how much the winner
paid. In the second example, non-winners do not know what the winner
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paid, and then including regret in the utility function hurts the bid-
taker's expected revenue at equilibrium. We conclude with a brief sum-
mary and overview.
The Model:
This section defines our model and establishes our main result.
In particular, we consider an independent, but not necessarily pri-
vately known, values model with risk neutral bidders. Roughly
speaking, in such a model, if losers learn the winners price, then
bidders' optimal strategies do not depend on the relative weight given
to expected profit versus expected regret.
Specifically, consider a sealed bid auction for a single object.
The bid-taker has a known reservation price of r; hereafter, we treat
this reservation price as if it were simply a bid by the bid-taker. A.
known number, possibly random, of risk neutral bidders submit sealed
bids for the object. The highest bidder wins the object, and pays an
amount equal to his bid.
Bidders obtain private information—information beyond that which
all bidders know—by observing the outcome of random variables with a
known joint distribution. Specifically, look at the problem from the
viewpoint of a particular bidder i. Let x denote the outcome of X
observed by i, and let
_y denote the vector of outcomes of Y_ observed by
other bidders. For later convenience, let y. denote the jth component
of
_y, and let y* (respectively Y*) denote the largest component of
_y
(respectively Y_) . Assume that the random variable Y*|X = x has a prob-
ability density function for each possible x.
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Bidder i can estimate his value from the object conditional on
having observed x. However, this estimated value need not be inde-
pendent of others' observations
_y. Therefore, let v(x,_v) denote the
expected value of the object to i conditional on x and y_, where the
expectation is over any components of the true state of nature that
would still be uncertain even if i were to have observed both x and y_.
Assume that v(x,_y) is bounded.
After observing their respective component of (x,y), each bidder
bids. Assume that for some reason
—
perhaps the auction has a symmetric
Nash equilibrium—each of the other bidders bids as if he were simply
substituting the outcome he observed into some function b( •); this b( •)
may, but need not, correspond to a Nash equilibrium. (Although we do
not require the model to be symmetric, the existence of a symmetric
equilibrium arises most naturally from symmetric models.) We assume
that the function b(«) increases montonically and is continuously dif-
ferentiable; Milgrom and Weber (1982) establish appropriate conditions
so that Nash equilibrium strategies satisfy our assumptions.
Eventually, at some time after he submitted his bid, i learns
something additional about the auction. In particular, i learns
whether or not he won the object. We presume that i learns the win-
ner's price. In addition, i might learn something about how others
bid. Since we assume that each of the other bidders follows the mono-
tonic bidding strategy b(«), any information about others' bids re-
veals specific information about
_y. Thus, without loss of generality,
let w(_y,x) denote what i learns about
_y after the fact given that he
observed x; w(») may be vector valued. For example, if when i loses,
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he still eventually learns how much the winner paid for the object,
but nothing else about how others bid, then w(_y,x) is inf orraationless
—
for example, w(y,x) equals some constant. Alternatively, if i always
learns how its strongest competitor bid, then we might define w(y_,x) =
y*.
Although i does not know
_y, or even w, at the time of bidding, he
does know something about how they are related to the x that he observed.
Specifically, let F(y*|x), G(w|x,y*), and H(^|x,y*,w) denote the condi-
tional cumulative probability distribution functions of y* , w, and y_.
Assume that i knows these functions, or more precisely, that he acts as
if he were maximizing his expected utility with y*, w, and y_ distributed
according to these functions.
If i had known w before he bid, then he might have preferred to bid
differently. For example, if i knew how much the highest other bidder
would bid, then if i had thought of bidding more than this, he would
probably want to reduce his bid to just a hair above the highest other
bid; this would result in essentially zero money being left on the table.
Thus, we define the regret suffered by i if he wins with a bid of 3 to
be B~b(y*). Similarly, i might suffer regret when he loses if his ex-
pected value for the object exceeds his estimate of what the winner paid
for it. Thus, we define the regret Chat i suffers when he loses to be
/v(x,^_)dH(y_|x,y*,w)-b(y*) if this difference is positive, and zero other-
wise. Then at the time of bidding, i has an expected total regret of
R(x,B) = /
_,
(3-b(y*))dF(y*|x) + / , /max {0
,
/v(x ,y)dH(y |x,y*,w)
y*<b (3) y*>b (B) w y_
- b(y*) }dG(w |x ,y*)dF(y* |x) from bidding 3 after having observed x. In
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addition, at the time of bidding, i has an expected profit of n(x,8) =
/ _! (J7v(x,y)dH(y|x,y*,w)dG(w|x,y*)-6)dF(y*|x).
y*<b (8) wy
Of course, by definition, i chooses to bid that value of 6 which
maximizes his expected utility from the auction. We have already
assumed that the expected utility to i would be a weighted combination
of expected profit and expected regret. Thus, the expected utility to
i from bidding 8 after observing x, knowing that others will follow
the strategy b( • ) , and that he will eventually see w( •) evaluated at
whatever y_ others observed in addition to learning whether or not he
won the object and the winner's price may be written as follows:
U(x,S) = aH(x,B) + (l-ct)R(x,8)
Note that i suffers regret on losing the object only if his
expected value for the object (given whatever information he now has)
exceeds his estimate (also given whatever information he now has) of
the price that the object went for. The case of i just barely losing
the object will be of crucial importance. So, define the following con-
dition: For any given x, a, and optimal bid 8 by i given x and a,
Jv(x,y)dH(y |x,Y*=b-1 (8)) > 8 Vw: dG(w |x , Y*=b_1 ( 8) ) >0 (*)
y
In words, if i just barely misses winning the object, then he always
expects the object to have been worth at least as much as he bid for it,
This condition will hold in many, if not most real world auctions.
Theorem: If 1) at the end of the auction, a risk neutral bidder i
learns both whether or not he won the single object being sold, and the
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winner's price; 2) when i just barely misses winning the object, he
always expects the object to have been worth at least as much as he bid
for it; and 3) all other bidders bid as if they were following the same
monotonically increasing, continuously dif f erentiable bidding strategy;
then i's optimal bid is independent of the relative weights given to
profit and regret in his utility function.
Proof: For a bid B > r to be optimal, it must satisfy the first order
dU ( x 8)
condition . - * — = 0. But, for our model, this condition becomes
a 8
a[ -— (//v(x,y)dH(y|x,Y*=b" 1 (S),w)dG(w|x,Y*=b" 1 (8))-B)dF(b" 1 (B) |x)-F(b" 1 (3)
b'(b (8)) wy
= (l-a)[0 + F(b
_1
(6)|x)
~ fmaxfO, fv(x,y)dH(y |x,Y^-b" 1 (8),w)-8}dG(w|x,Y^=b" 1 (;3))dF(b" 1 (8) |x).
b'(b (3)) w y
Now, using condition (*) and then combining like terras reduces the first
order condition to
J/v(x,y)dH(y |x,YA=b~ 1 (S),w)dG(w|x,Y*=b~ 1 (8))dF(b~ 1 (8) |x)
wv
= 6dF(b 1 (B)|x) + b'(b 1 (6))F(b l U)\x)
In addition, bidding 8 < r results in zero profit and positive expected
regret of i's expected value for the object exceeds the reservation
price r. Thus i should bid less than r if and only if his expected
value for the object conditional on winning with a bid &=r is less than
r. Thus both the condition for when i should bid at least r, and the
condition for what i should bid if he bids at least r are independent
of the relative weight given profit versus regret.
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Thus , roughly speaking, if losers learn what price the winner paid,
then the optimal bidding strategies are independent of a, and any theory
for expected profit maximizing bidders applies just as well if bidders
actually maximize some weighted average of expected profit and expected
regret as we have defined it.
Examples
:
This section provides two examples illustrating the above theorem.
In the first example, the stated conditions for the theorem hold, and
the optimal bid for i to make having seen x is independent of a. How-
ever, in the second example, if i loses, he does not learn the winner's
price; this violates the conditions assumed by the theorem. In this
example, i's optimal bid does depend on a. In fact, giving equal weight-
ing to profit and regret results in a strictly lower expected equilib-
rium price than if bidders simply maximized expected profit without
regard to regret.
We consider two examples with independent private values. Each of
the n risk neutral bidders knows his own value for the object. The
values are independent samples from the uniform distribution on the
unit interval. In both examples, the reservation price equals zero,
and the statistic w(Y_) is inf ormat ionless
.
In the first example, each of the other bidders bids (n-l)/n of his
actual value. At the end of the auction, i knows the winner's price,
and therefore can infer the winner's value for the object. We show that
i can do no better than to always bid (n-l)/n of his own value for the
object. (Thus, we have found a Nash equilibrium. The fact that this
Nash equilibrium is independent of a illustrates the theorem.)
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To determine i's optimal bid, start with three observations. First,
the other bidders will never bid greater than (n-l)/n. If i bids at
least (n-l)/n then he always wins. Bidding greater than (n-l)/n in-
creases the price without increasing the probability of winning. Thus,
i should never bid greater than (n-l)/n. Second, i should never bid
greater than his own value x; bidding greater than his own value may
result in i winning the object at a price greater than his own value,
an outcome to be avoided, and which can be avoided by bidding no more
than x. (Note that therefore, condition (*) will hold in any private
values example.) Third, a negative bid has essentially the same effect
as a bid of zero. Thus we need only consider nonnegative bids 8 '
min {x, (n-1) /n }.
Now, calculate the expected utility U(x,8) to i from bidding 3 when
his value is x. For < 8 <_ min {x, (n-l)/n 1, this expected utility equals
n8 n8 nx
n-1 „ n-1 . n-1
r / x , , \ n-z , , , . , t . ny w , . n— Z , f , nv . , , . n— z
,
a/ (x-S)(n-l)y dy-(l-a)[/ ( 8" -rr)(n-l)y dy + / (x- -^-) (n-l)y dy
y=0 y=0
n X y=E
Tf
n
where y denotes the largest of the other bidders' values. Differen-
tiating this expression with respect to 8, setting the result equal to
zero, and solving for 8 yields 8 - (n-l)x/n independent of a. Thus,
i's optimal bid is independent of a. Furthermore, since i's optimal
strategy is to follow the same strategy as followed by the other bid-
ders, we have a symmetric Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium strategy
is independent of a.
On the other hand, to illustrate the crucial role played by the
assumption that i learns the winner's price, now consider a second
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example. In this second example, losers only learn that they lost.
If a = 1, then we get the same Nash equilibrium as before—whether or
not losers know the winner's price does not effect the Nash equil-
ibrium (or any other optimal strategy for that matter) if i bids
solely to maximize expected profit.
However, in contrast to the case a = 1, now consider the case
a 1/2 and n = 2. Then, for i to have no better alternative than to
follow the strategy b( • ) when the other bidder follows the strategy
b(0, we need the following first order condition to hold:
,
b
_1
(6) b
_1
(6) 1
— [/ (x-B)dy - / (6-b(y))dy]| = when / (x-b(y))dy <
ats y=0 y=0 B=b(x) y=x
and
,
b
_1
(6) b
_1
(8) 1
-± [/ (x-S)dy - [/ (6-b(y))dy + / (x-b(y))dy]
]
P y=0 y=0 y=b (8) 8=b(x)
1
when / (x-b(y))dy 2 0.
y=x
In addition, b(x) must be continuous x, and, if i bids r, then his
value x for the object must have been zero; specifically, b(0) = 0,
Consider the following candidate for the equilibrium strategy:
-n- for x
_< x*
b(x) =
{
J
2
— -
-
— for x > xA ,
2 ox —
1
where J (x*-b(y))dy =
y=x*
and so x* equals approximately 0.3148.
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To verify that this satisfies the necessary first order condition,
observe that
1 *2
/ <«-<f - Tb-))dy
y=x
is nonnegative for x*
_< x <_ 1, and for this range of x, b(x) = x/2 -
C /x satisfies the appropriate first order condition. In addition,
--
-k
! cx-f)dy + / (X
-(f -|--))dy
y=x y=x*
is nonpositive for < x <_ x* , and for this range of x, b(x) = x/3 +
C_ satisfies the appropriate first order condition. Finally, b(0) =
2
and b(x) is continuous at x = x* if C = x* /6 and C~ = 0. In fact,
the stated strategy is unique (symmetric) equilibrium strategy for
this example.
Notice that this equilibrium differs from that when a = 1 (where
b(x) = (n-l)x/n = x/2 for n = 2 was the unique equilibrium strategy).
Thus, the result of the theorem depends critically on the loser knowing
the winner's price. Furthermore, at least in this example, if the loser
does not learn the winner's price, then the bid-taker's expected reve-
nue suffers; the b(x) defined above is strictly less than x/2 for all x
greater than zero, and therefore the two bidders bid less when a = 1/2
than when a = 1.
Summary:
We consider a model of auctions and competitive bidding for a single
object in which the bidders, although risk neutral, consider regret in
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addition to profit when deciding how to bid. As we defined it, regret
comes from two sources—the winner paying more for the object than the
second highest bidder bid, and a loser possibly having a value for the
object in excess of what the winner paid for it. Then, if losers learn
what the winner's price, a bidder's expected utility maximizing bidding
strategy is independent of the relative weight given to regret versus
profit; the first example illustrates this theorem.
A. second example illustrates the importance of losers learning the
winner's price. In the second example, losers do not learn the winner's
price and the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy depends on the relative
weight given regrets versus profits. In fact, the bid-taker's expected
equilibrium drops as the relative weight on regret increases.
Throughout the paper, we gave the regret suffered by a loser equal
weight to that suffered by a winner. In practice, however, the regret
suffered by a winner— the money left on the table—may have a larger
weight than the opportunity losses of a loser. But, if we start with
equal weightings on both types of regret, and then move toward more
weight on winner's regret, a bidder's optimal bid decreases—he becomes
relatively more concerned about overbidding than before and therefore
should decrease the expected amount of overbid somewhat at the expense
of somewhat increased, but less heavily weighted, regret from under-
bidding and losing when his value exceeds the winner's price. Of course,
the amount by which the bidder's optimal bid decreases depends not only
on the relative weight on the two types of regret, but also on the rela-
tive weight on regret versus profit. In short, the heavier the weight
on regret from money left on the table compared to loser's regret or
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compared to expected profit when winner's regret has a higher weight
than losers' regret, the lower the bidder's optimal bid.
This effect on a bidder's expected utility maximizing bid of the
relative weights on the two types of regret provides the intuition
behind the second example. In particular, by giving losers less infor-
mation about the winner's price, losers must calculate their regret
based on the expected winner's price. However, even if the expected
winner's price exceeds a loser's value, the winner's price might have
some positive probability of exceeding the loser's value. Thus, with-
out specific information about the winner's price, the loser may have
no regret even though in the same situation, if he were told the winner's
price, the loser would have positive regret with positive probability
—
therefore a positive expected regret. As a result, the less information
a loser has about the winner's price, the less regret he suffers on
average when losing. So, in effect, not knowing the winner's price
reduces the relative weight on loser's regret from the weight given
loser's regret when losers know the winner's price. Thus, losers not
knowing the winner's price decreases the optimum bid, as illustrated
in the second example.
In summary, for sealed-bid, first-price auctions of a single object
to risk neutral bidders, a bidder's expected utility maximizing bidding
strategy does not depend on the relative weight given to regret versus
profit so long as losers learn the winner's price and both types of
regret have equal weight in the bidder's utility function. Making the
winner's regret over money left on the table more important than loser's
regret over lost opportunities decreases the optimal bids. Not telling
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losers the winner's price in effect puts less weight on loser's regrets
relative to winner's regret and therefore also decreases the optimal
bid. In either case, the amount of decrease in the optimal bid depends
on the relative weight given regret versus profit.
Thus, this establishes the importance of losers knowing the winner's
price and of both types of regret having equal importance if the theory
derived from models with expected profit maximizing bidders is to be
applied to cases where regret enters into bidders' utility functions
in the way modelled in this paper. Roughly speaking, the theory for
expected profit maximizing bidders applies just as well to bidders con-
cerned about regret if and only if losers learn what price the winner
paid and if bidders place equal weight on both types of regret. There-
fore, the previous models' exclusion of regret from the utility functions
affects the applicability of the theory for risk neutral bidders in
first-price sealed-bid auctions only in certain, now clearly delineated,
cases
.
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